

11 The Future of America's Continental Commitment

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Probably the most important post-Cold War foreign policy question facing both Americans and Europeans is whether US military forces will remain in Europe now that the Soviet threat has gone away. The Clinton administration has emphasized that the troops will stay. Former Secretary of State Warren Christopher, for example, stated in 1995 that, 'We will continue to maintain approximately 100 000 American troops on European soil. We will continue to help preserve peace and prosperity for the next 50 years and beyond – this time for the entire continent.'¹ Nevertheless, serious doubts about the future of America's 'continental commitment' remain on both sides of the Atlantic.²

APPROACH AND ARGUMENT

Policy-makers as well as social scientists know that predicting the behavior of great powers is a tricky business. However, there is a sound approach for assessing whether the United States is likely to remain militarily engaged in Europe. There is a substantial historical record regarding the deployment of American troops to Europe, which includes periods of military commitment as well as non-commitment. The key to anticipating America's future military role on the continent is to survey the inventory of potential grand strategies that might explain past American behavior towards Europe, as well as other strategically important areas of the world, and determine which one best explains the variation in the historical record.³ That grand strategy can then be matched against the evolving political situation in Europe to determine the likely direction of future American policy.

There are four different grand strategies that might be used to explain past American behavior towards Europe and predict the future. *Isolationism* is based on the belief that the United States is so secure that it does not have to worry about the balance of power in other regions of the world. Therefore, it should not commit military forces to Europe, or any other area outside the Western Hemisphere. However, isolationism does not preclude American diplomatic and economic involvement in Europe. *Global hegemony* is based on the belief that great powers have a powerful incentive to dominate the international system, and therefore the United States will look for opportunities to maintain large troop deployments in Europe so that it can dominate

that continent the way it dominates the Western Hemisphere. *Counter-hegemony* is based on the belief that the United States is principally concerned that no great power dominate any region of the world the way that the United States rules the Western Hemisphere. Therefore, the United States will only commit military forces to Europe when a potential hegemon is on the verge of becoming a real hegemon. Finally, *regional stability* is based on the belief that the United States has a profound interest in preserving peace in Europe. Ergo, American troops will be stationed in Europe when there is a threat of war.

When these four grand strategies are run up against the historical record, counter-hegemony emerges as the clear winner. The United States has committed troops to Europe three times in this century, and each time the purpose was to check a potential hegemon: Wilhelmine Germany in the First World War, Nazi Germany in the Second World War, and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Isolationism has obviously not been an attractive grand strategy, since American troops have been physically located in Europe for 62 years of this century.⁴ The United States would probably like to be a global hegemon, but it never has had the awesome power projection capabilities required to occupy and dominate distant continents. Therefore, the United States has not pursued that ambitious goal, but has instead sought to dominate the Western Hemisphere and thwart the rise of a peer competitor in Europe. Finally, there is little evidence that the United States has considered regional stability an important enough goal to justify expending American blood and iron. After all, the United States stayed on its side of the Atlantic during the years of crises leading up to the First World War and the Second World War, and then remained on the sidelines during the early years of both of those conflicts while Europeans killed each other in vast numbers.

Two analogous cases provide further support for the claim that the United States commits large-scale military forces abroad to counter potential hegemons, but not to maintain regional stability or gain global hegemony. Britain, like the United States, is separated from the European continent by a large body of water, and it has a long history of moving troops to and from the continent. Britain too has tended to accept continental commitments only when a rival great power has threatened to overrun Europe and become the regional hegemon. Furthermore, American troop deployments to Asia in the twentieth century appear to follow the same pattern that we observe in Europe.

Thus, it appears the future of the American military commitment to Europe depends on whether there is a potential hegemon on the continent that the local great powers themselves cannot contain, thus mandating an American military presence. Germany and Russia are probably the most powerful states in post-Cold War Europe, but neither has the earmarks of a potential hegemon. In short, there is no threat of a dominating great power

on the horizon in Europe. Therefore, American troops are likely to leave Europe in the next decade.

The next section describes the alternative grand strategies that might explain past and future American force deployments in Europe. The subsequent section describes the history of America's continental commitment over the course of the twentieth century. It is followed by a section that aims to determine how well each grand strategy accounts for the historical record. The next two sections examine the logic underpinning the deployment of American troops to Asia, and Britain's continental commitment. The final section considers the future of the American military presence in Europe.

COMPETING GRAND STRATEGIES

Discussions about the future of the American military commitment to Europe often focus on public opinion polls. Proponents of the status quo tend to buttress their position by noting that there is significant public support on both sides of the Atlantic for keeping American troops in Europe. However, relying on public opinion polls to predict the future is problematic because public opinion on important foreign policy issues can change dramatically in short order. As discussed below, American public opinion on a continental commitment underwent a sea change in the spring of 1940. Who is to say that there will not be a dramatic shift in current thinking about a continental commitment in the next few years? We need to know why public opinion changes.

In fact, public opinion on important policy issues largely reflects how elites as well as the broader public think about the national interest. Public opinion, in social science jargon, is a dependent variable. Therefore, we need to determine what calculations regarding the national interest drive public opinion. Specifically, we need to identify alternative grand strategies that might explain when and why it is in America's self-interest to maintain military forces in Europe, and then evaluate those strategies to determine which best explains past American behavior. There are four candidate strategies.

Isolationism posits that the security of the United States is largely unaffected by shifts in the European balance of power.⁵ In fact, the United States is so secure that it does not matter if a single great power rules Europe, because even a European hegemon cannot threaten the American homeland. According to isolationist logic, there would have been no adverse strategic consequences for the United States if Germany had won either the First World War or the Second World War, or if the Soviet Union had dominated all of Europe after 1945. Thus, there is no good strategic rationale for committing American forces to Europe. Indeed, there are good reasons for

avoiding a continental commitment. Not only would the United States run the risk of being dragged into Europe's deadly wars for no good strategic purpose, but maintaining large forces abroad is likely to create a garrison state at home, which would threaten America's democratic traditions as well as its economic health.

Isolationism does not ban or even discourage active diplomatic or economic involvement in world affairs. It simply mandates that the United States not accept military commitments outside the Western Hemisphere. Moreover, isolationism does not argue against maintaining powerful military forces, but those forces must be confined to defending the American homeland, not states on other continents.

Geography is the main basis of America's strategic immunity. The United States is physically separated from Europe and Asia by two huge oceans that a potential attacker would have to cross to attack the United States. Projecting military power across large bodies of water against a rival great power's homeland is an extremely difficult task. Indeed, there is only one case in modern history of an amphibious assault on the homeland of a great power: the British and French invasion of Russia's Crimean Peninsula during the Crimean War (1853–56).⁶ George Fielding Eliot aptly described isolationist thinking about American impregnability in 1938: 'Providence, in its infinite mercy and wisdom, has been very good to this nation. We have been given a geographical position far removed from dangerous neighbors. The genius of man has not yet created instruments of aggressive warfare which can span the oceans which protect us.'⁷

The development of a huge American nuclear arsenal after 1945 further reinforced the case for isolationism. If a European great power tried to invade the American homeland, its assault forces would be an inviting target for a nuclear attack as they moved across the ocean. Furthermore, the United States would surely be tempted to retaliate with nuclear forces if a rival great power managed to invade its territory. Thus, after 1945, the United States could rely on nuclear deterrence as well as the two giant moats on its flanks to protect itself from either a European or an Asian hegemon.

The case for *global hegemony* is based on the belief that states worry greatly about the balance of power because their survival may someday depend on how much power they have relative to their competitors.⁸ The principal goal of states is to maximize their relative power, which is tantamount to saying that states aim to be the hegemon in the system. Immanuel Kant put the point well: 'It is the desire of every state, or its ruler, to arrive at a condition of perpetual peace by conquering the whole world if that were possible.' Survival would then be almost guaranteed because there would be no rival state that could threaten the hegemon.

The United States, with its great wealth and large population, is probably the only great power in the twentieth century with sufficient socioeconomic

resources to think about dominating the world. Europe is certainly a key area to control, since it is an especially wealthy region that has long been home to most of the world's great powers, who would presumably be the most dangerous rivals of the United States. Therefore, for purposes of enhancing its security, the United States looks for opportunities to establish a hegemonic position in Europe as well as other strategically important regions of the globe.

Counter-hegemony also starts from the premise that the United States is concerned with maximizing its share of world power, and is therefore especially concerned about Europe because other great powers are located there. However, this grand strategy makes no pretense about the United States becoming a global hegemon, mainly because the power projection requirements are beyond its capacity. The United States simply has never had sufficient military forces to conquer and dominate Europe.⁹ The same power projection problems that would hinder a European hegemon from trying to cross the Atlantic and invade the United States would work in reverse to cripple an American assault against Europe. Moreover, Europe's great powers would surely join together to thwart any such American offensive.

Given these limits on maximizing relative power, the main goals of US grand strategy are to maintain its hegemonic position in the Western Hemisphere, where the power projection problem is much less acute, and to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon in Europe, or any other rich area of the world. In essence, a European hegemon would dominate its region of the globe the way the United States has dominated the Western Hemisphere for the past one hundred years. The United States would then confront a European superpower with Europe's vast resources at its disposal, and free of rival great powers in its own backyard. That state would then be well-positioned to challenge the United States in the Western Hemisphere as well as other regions of the globe. Thus, the United States aims to ensure that no state dominates Europe and that the United States remains the world's only regional hegemon.

If there is a rough balance of power among Europe's great powers, there is no need for American forces to be deployed on the continent since there is no threat of a hegemon. If a potential hegemon emerges in Europe, the initial response of the United States is to pass the buck to the other European great powers so they do the hard work of balancing against the potential hegemon. American troops only go to Europe if the local great powers cannot do the balancing themselves and the potential hegemon appears to be on the verge of becoming an actual hegemon, and thus a peer competitor of the United States.

Counter-hegemony does not provide clear guidance on whether peace in Europe is in America's strategic interest. The main danger associated with war is that a potential hegemon might win a quick and decisive victory against

its local rivals and establish dominance on the continent before the United States could effectively intervene. At that point, the United States would be hard pressed to restore the status quo ante. A potential benefit of war, however, is that the local balancing coalition might either defeat the potential hegemon or so weaken it in a protracted war of attrition that the United States could then enter the conflict at the last moment and help finish off the aspiring hegemon.

Unlike the previous three grand strategies, considerations about the balance of power do not matter much for *regional stability*, the final grand strategy. Instead, the claim is that peace in Europe is a vital American interest, and because there is a reasonable chance of war breaking out in Europe, the United States must station troops on the continent to serve as 'Europe's pacifier'.¹⁰ The Clinton administration frequently makes this argument. For example, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright recently told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that 'European stability depends in large measure on continued American engagement and leadership. And as history attests, European stability is also vital to our national interests. As a result we will remain engaged.'¹¹ This line of argument is also widely employed by individuals outside the Clinton administration, especially academics who favor keeping American troops in Europe.¹²

Peace in Europe matters greatly to the United States for economic reasons. Specifically, there is so much economic interdependence between Europe and the United States that a major European war would not only badly damage the economies of the warring states, but would also seriously hurt the American economy, even if the United States was not involved in the fighting. Damaging the American economy would not only undermine prosperity at home, but might also weaken American power, since wealth is the foundation of military might.

Another reason for preventing war in Europe is that the United States invariably gets dragged into those conflicts. Madeleine Albright recently claimed that 'We have an interest in European security, because we wish to avoid the instability that drew 5 million Americans across the Atlantic to fight in two world wars.'¹³ In essence, it is an illusion for Americans to think that they can sit out a European war. Therefore, it makes good sense to preserve peace by keeping forces on the continent. Unless policy-makers believe that war is 'obsolete', this grand strategy would presumably call for an open-ended commitment of American troops to Europe.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN EUROPE

Before the twentieth century, the United States did not have sufficient military might to intervene in Europe's wars. Indeed, it is widely agreed

that the United States did not achieve great power status until 1898, when it defeated Spain in a brief war and then began building a military with significant power projection capability. During the nineteenth century and earlier, the United States was primarily concerned with expanding its frontiers in North America and building a viable state.

The twentieth century is a different story. The United States has not only had the military capability to intervene in Europe's politics, but often has done so. However, there have also been periods when the United States eschewed a continental commitment. The best way to describe the movement of American forces into and out of Europe is to divide the present century into six periods. The first period covers the years from 1900 to April 1917, when the United States stationed no troops in Europe, continuing the tradition of avoiding 'entangling alliances' first outlined by the Founding Fathers and carefully followed by American leaders in the nineteenth century. There were a number of serious diplomatic crises in Europe during the early twentieth century, culminating in the outbreak of the First World War on 1 August 1914. But they did not prompt the United States to make a continental commitment.

The second period covers American participation in the First World War, which was the first time in its history that the United States sent troops to Europe.¹⁴ The United States declared war against Germany on 6 April 1917, but was only able to send four divisions to France by the end of 1917. However, large numbers of troops started arriving on the continent in early 1918, and by the time the war ended on 11 November 1918, there were about two million American soldiers stationed in Europe, and more on their way. Indeed, Pershing was projected to have more than four million troops under his command by July 1919. Most of the American Expeditionary Force was brought home right after the war ended, although a small occupation force remained in Germany until January 1923.

The third period covers the years from 1923 to the summer of 1940. The United States committed no forces to the continent during these years. The 1920s and early 1930s were relatively peaceful years in Europe. However, Hitler came to power in January 1933 and soon thereafter Europe was in turmoil again. The Second World War began on 1 September 1939, when Germany attacked Poland, and Britain and France responded by immediately declaring war against Germany. The United States made no serious move towards a continental commitment when the war broke out.

The fourth period covers the five years from the summer of 1940, when Germany decisively defeated France and drove the remnants of the British army off the continent at Dunkirk, until the end of the Second World War in Europe. The fall of France precipitated a dramatic change in American thinking about a continental commitment.¹⁵ Suddenly there was widespread support for providing substantial aid to Britain, which now stood alone

against Germany, and for preparing the American military for a possible war with Germany.¹⁶ By the early fall of 1940, public opinion polls showed that for the first time since Hitler came to power, a majority of Americans believed it was more important to ensure that Britain defeat Germany than to avoid a European war.¹⁷ Furthermore, the US Congress drastically increased defense spending in the summer of 1940, making it possible to start building an expeditionary force for Europe.¹⁸ However, the United States did not formally go to war against Germany until 11 December 1941, when Hitler declared war against the United States four days after the Japanese attack at Pearl Harbor. Moreover, American troops did not set foot on the continent until the Sicily landings in July 1943. The Normandy invasion took place almost a year later on 6 June 1944.

The fifth period covers the Cold War, which ran roughly from 1945 to 1991 when the Soviet Union collapsed. The United States had planned to bring all of its troops home soon after the Second World War ended, as it had done after the First World War. But by 1950, there were still about 80 000 American troops in Europe, mainly involved with the occupation of Germany.¹⁹ As the Cold War intensified in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the United States formed NATO (1949) and eventually made a commitment to remain in Europe and substantially increase American force levels on the continent (1950). By 1953, there were 427 000 American troops stationed in Europe, which was the high-water mark for the Cold War. The United States also deployed about 7000 nuclear weapons on European soil during the 1950s and early 1960s. Although there was variation over time in American troop levels in Europe, the number never dipped below 300 000.

The sixth period covers the post-Cold War period, running from 1991 to the present. The United States has significantly reduced its presence in Europe since the collapse of the Soviet Union. There are now about 100 000 American troops and no more than 500 nuclear weapons in Europe. What the future holds for these forces is the question at hand.

ASSESSING THE CANDIDATE GRAND STRATEGIES

The United States obviously did not employ an isolationist grand strategy towards Europe in the twentieth century. The United States fought against Germany in both world wars and then maintained a huge military establishment in Europe during the Cold War, which spanned more than four decades. There is no question that the United States made no continental commitment either from 1900 to 1917, or from 1923 to 1940, and that isolationism might explain American behavior in those two periods. However, it cannot explain the other periods in this century – 1917–23, 1940–45, 1945–91, and 1991 to the present – when the United States accepted a continental commitment.

It is also apparent that at no point in this century did the United States follow the dictates of global hegemony and attempt to occupy and dominate Europe. The United States reluctantly entered the First World War and exited Europe soon after the war ended. The United States can hardly be accused of looking for opportunities to get involved in the Second World War when it broke out in 1939, and when the war ended, the United States was anxious to bring the boys home as quickly as possible. Although it proved impossible to exit Europe after 1945 – and indeed, American troop levels were significantly increased in the early 1950s – there was little enthusiasm in the United States for maintaining a military presence in Europe. To secure Senate approval for the NATO treaty in 1949, Dean Acheson had to emphasize that the United States had no intention of sending large forces to Europe on a more or less permanent basis. Throughout the 1950s, President Eisenhower expressed interest in bringing American forces home and forcing the West Europeans to defend themselves against the Soviet threat.²⁰ Furthermore, there was strong sentiment in the US Senate in the late 1960s and early 1970s to reduce, if not eliminate, America's continental commitment. Even during the heyday of the Reagan years, influential voices called for significant reductions in American troop levels in Europe.

Nevertheless, American force levels in Europe were hardly affected by this dissatisfaction with the continental commitment. The key point is that the United States displayed little interest during the Cold War in becoming a hegemonic power in Europe. That behavior explains why no West European state feared an American military takeover of Europe during the Cold War, despite the awesome military might that the United States had stationed on the continent. Instead, the Europeans worried that American soldiers would go home.

There is even evidence that by the early 1970s the Soviet Union preferred that the United States remain militarily engaged in Europe rather than abandon the continent. Specifically, it appears that the Soviet Union entered into the Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) talks with the United States in 1973 for the purpose of undermining the US Senate's efforts to force the Nixon administration to sharply reduce American troop levels in Europe.²¹ Basically, the Soviets feared Germany more than they did the United States, and wanted American troops to remain in Germany in large numbers to keep the Germans down. Apparently, the Soviets did not worry that the United States would attempt to conquer Europe. Regarding the post-Cold War period, there is little evidence that the United States is bent on becoming a European hegemon. Not surprisingly, Europeans today do not fear an American takeover, and would prefer American troops to remain in Europe to help keep the peace.

It is also clear that since achieving great power status, the United States has not been willing to accept a continental commitment for the purpose of

maintaining peace in Europe. No American troops were sent across the Atlantic to help prevent the First World War or to stop it once the fighting broke out. Nor was the United States willing to accept a continental commitment to deter Nazi Germany or halt the fighting after Poland was attacked in September 1939. In both cases, the United States eventually joined the successful fight against Germany and helped create peace in Europe. However, the United States did not fight to make peace in either world war, but instead fought to defeat a dangerous foe. Peace was a welcome byproduct of a continental commitment. The same point holds for the Cold War. American military forces were in Europe to contain the Soviet Union, not to maintain peace in that volatile region. The long peace that ensued was the consequence of a successful deterrence policy.

Counter-hegemony best accounts for America's past continental commitments. The United States sent military forces to Europe three times in the twentieth century, and each time it was because there was a potential hegemon that the other great powers in the region could not contain. Otherwise, the United States has been unwilling to accept a continental commitment.

The United States entered the First World War in early April 1917 because there was considerable evidence that Germany might win the war and dominate all of Europe.²² The Russian army, which had been badly mauled by the German army in the war's first three years, was on the verge of disintegration on 12 March 1917, when revolution broke out and the tsar was removed from power. The French army was also in precarious shape, and mutinied in early May 1917, shortly after the United States entered the war. The British army was in the best shape of the three allied armies, mainly because it spent the first two years of the war expanding into a mass army, and thus it had not been bled white like the French and Russian armies. Britain was nevertheless in desperate straits by April 1917, because Germany had launched an unrestricted submarine campaign against British shipping in February 1917, which was threatening to knock Britain out of the war by the early fall of that year. Consequently, the United States had to enter the war in the spring of 1917 to bolster the Triple Entente and prevent a German victory.²³

The United States began rapidly moving towards a continental commitment in the spring of 1940 because of the fall of France. By the late 1930s, American policy-makers recognized that Nazi Germany was a potential hegemon and that Hitler was likely to attempt to conquer Europe. However, as was the case in the First World War, the United States initially made no military commitment to Europe to deal with the German threat, but relied instead on Europe's other great powers to do the heavy lifting.²⁴ American decision-makers expected the British and French armies to stop a Wehrmacht offensive in the West and force a protracted war of attrition that would sap Germany's military might. Stalin expected the same outcome. But the

Wehrmacht won a stunning victory in France, leaving the Nazi war machine in a position to take on the Red Army in a one-on-one engagement.

American policy-makers feared that Germany would win that war and establish hegemonic control over Europe. After all, Germany had knocked Russia out of the First World War while Germany was fighting a two-front war where it actually had substantially more divisions fighting against the British and French than against the Russians.²⁵ This time the Germans would be fighting a one-front war. Also, Stalin's purge of the Red Army between 1937 and 1941 had markedly reduced its fighting power.²⁶ This problem was graphically demonstrated during the winter of 1939–40, when the Red Army had significant trouble defeating the badly outnumbered Finnish army. After the fall of France, there was ample reason to think that Germany was on the threshold of dominating Europe, and therefore the United States began making preparations for a continental commitment.

The United States kept military forces in Europe after the Second World War because the Soviet Union controlled the eastern two-thirds of the continent and had the military might to conquer the rest of it. There was no local great power that could contain the Soviet Union. Germany was in ruins and neither France nor Britain had the wherewithal to stop the mighty Red Army, which had just crushed the vaunted Wehrmacht. Only the United States had sufficient military power to prevent Soviet hegemony after 1945, so American troops remained in Europe throughout the Cold War. Nevertheless, there remained a strong impulse in the American body politic to pull American troops out of Europe and compel the West Europeans to deal with the Soviet threat themselves.

THE HISTORY OF AMERICA'S MILITARY PRESENCE IN ASIA

The American commitment of military forces to Asia appears to follow the same counter-hegemony pattern we see at work in Europe. There was no potential hegemon in Asia for the first three decades of the twentieth century. Japan and Russia were the local great powers, but neither had the military might to dominate Asia. Although Japan won a major victory in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), its political gains from the war were limited – in part because of diplomatic pressure from the United States, but mainly because Japan was not yet powerful enough to use that victory as the opening move in a drive to hegemony.²⁷ Britain and France were involved in Asian politics during this period because their colonial empires extended into the region. They were both committed to checking Japanese and Russian ambitions in the Far East. The United States was briefly involved in some minor Asian conflicts in the early twentieth century, such as the Boxer Rebellion in China (1900), but it did not commit large-scale military forces to Asia at that time.

Japan started wars of conquest against China in 1931 and again in 1937. The Japanese also fought a number of border skirmishes with the Soviet Union between 1935 and 1938, which culminated in a brief war in the summer of 1939 at Nomonhan, a city located on the border between Japanese-controlled Manchuria and Soviet-dominated Outer Mongolia.²⁸ Japan's ultimate aim in these conflicts was to make territorial gains on the Asian continent at the expense of the Soviet Union. It was apparent by the late 1930s that Japan was bent on dominating Asia.

However, the United States did not move troops to Asia to contain Japanese aggression, but instead pursued a pass-the-buck strategy. Specifically, the United States relied on Britain, China, France, and especially the Soviet Union, to check Japan. Although China was not a great power at the time, it managed to pin down the Japanese army in a costly and protracted war that Japan was unable to win.²⁹ The Soviets played a crucial role in containing Japan by maintaining large forces in Asia and by inflicting major defeats on the Japanese army in 1938 and especially 1939.³⁰ Britain was actually inclined to pull forces out of Asia and strike a deal with Japan in the late 1930s so that it could concentrate its efforts on dealing with the more dangerous German threat.³¹ The United States, however, made it clear that any diminution of British force levels in Asia was unacceptable and that Britain would have to remain engaged in Asia and balance against Japan. Otherwise, the United States might not help Britain deal with the German threat in Europe. The British stayed in Asia.

The Asian balance of power was turned upside down by the fall of France in June 1940 and the German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941.³² The quick and decisive German victory over France and Britain in the late spring of 1940 greatly reduced, if not eliminated, their influence on Japanese behavior in Asia. Indeed, the defeat of France and the Netherlands meant that their empires in Southeast Asia were now vulnerable to Japanese attack. Japan was quick to exploit the situation and began expanding its empire southward in the summer of 1940.

When Hitler attacked the Soviet Union one year later, the Americans feared, above all else, that Japan would move northward and attack the Soviet Union from the rear, helping the Germans finish off the Soviet Union. Germany would then be the hegemon in Europe, while in Asia only the Chinese would stand in the way of Japanese hegemony. Not surprisingly, the United States began moving military forces to Asia in the fall of 1941 to deal with the Japanese threat.³³ Shortly thereafter, Japan attacked the United States at Pearl Harbor, guaranteeing that massive American military forces would move across the Pacific for the first time. Their goal would be to crush Japan, the aspiring hegemon in Asia.

The United States maintained military forces in Asia after the Second World War for essentially the same reason it accepted a continental commit-

ment in Europe. The Soviet Union, which had long been an Asian power, was a threat to that region's balance of power, and there were no local great powers to contain it. Japan was in ruins and China, which hardly qualified as a great power, was in the midst of a civil war. Britain and France were certainly in no position to contest the Soviet Union in Asia, and so the United States had little choice but to fill that power vacuum. Indeed, the United States ended up fighting two bloody wars in Asia during the Cold War, while not firing a shot in Europe.

BRITAIN'S CONTINENTAL COMMITMENT

Like the United States, Britain is an insular state separated from the continent by a substantial body of water, and it too has a history of sending troops to the European mainland. Britain has also followed a counter-hegemony strategy.³⁴ Indeed, in his famous 1907 memorandum about British security policy, Sir Eyre Crowe writes, 'It has become almost an historical truism to identify England's secular policy with the maintenance of this [European] balance by throwing her weight... on the side opposed to the political dictatorship of the strongest single state.'³⁵ Consider British military policy towards the continent from 1792, when the wars of the French Revolution started, until the Cold War ended in 1991. Those two centuries can be roughly divided into six periods.

The first period, 1792–1815, covers the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars. France was by far the most powerful state on the continent during this period, and it was bent on dominating Europe. France was an especially aggressive and formidable great power after Napoleon took full control of France in 1800. In fact, by the time Napoleon's armies entered Moscow in the fall of 1812, France controlled most of Europe. However, the French attempt at hegemony was ultimately thwarted, and the British army played an important role in bringing Napoleon down. The British had a tiny army on the continent fighting against the French from 1793 until 1795, when French victories and the subsequent collapse of the coalition arrayed against France forced British troops off the mainland.³⁶ Britain placed an army in Portugal and Spain in 1808, which eventually helped inflict a decisive defeat on the large French forces in Spain.³⁷ That same British army helped deliver the final blow against Napoleon at Waterloo (1814).

The second period runs from 1816 to 1904, when Britain adopted a policy commonly referred to as 'splendid isolation'.³⁸ Britain made no continental commitment during this period, despite the fact that there were numerous wars involving the great powers on the continent. Most importantly, Britain did not intervene in either the Austro-Prussian War (1866) or the Franco-Prussian War (1870). Britain sent no troops to Europe during these nine

decades because there was a rough balance of power on the continent.³⁹ France, which was the potential hegemon before 1815, lost relative power over the course of the nineteenth century, while Germany, which would emerge as the next potential hegemon in the early twentieth century, was not yet powerful enough to make a run for control of Europe. In the absence of a potential hegemon, Britain had no good strategic reason to move troops to the European mainland.

The third period runs from 1905 to 1929 and was dominated by Britain's efforts to contain Wilhelmine Germany, which was emerging as a potential hegemon as the nineteenth century drew to a close. It was apparent as early as 1890 that Germany – with its mighty army, large population, and dynamic industrial base – was rapidly becoming Europe's most powerful state.⁴⁰ Indeed, France and Russia formed an alliance in 1894 to counter this emerging threat.⁴¹ Britain would have preferred to let France and Russia contain Germany, but it was clear by 1905 that they could not do the job alone and would need help from Britain. The power differences between France and Germany as well as between Russia and Germany continued to widen in Germany's favor. Furthermore, Russia suffered a major military defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–5), which left its army in terrible shape and in no condition to engage the German army. Finally, the Germans initiated a crisis with France over Morocco in late March 1905, which was designed to isolate France from both Britain and Russia, thus leaving Germany in a position to dominate Europe.

In response to this deteriorating strategic environment, Britain allied with France and Russia, forming the Triple Entente. In essence, Britain made a continental commitment to deal with the German threat.⁴² Appropriately, when the First World War broke out on 1 August 1914, Britain immediately sent an expeditionary force to the continent to help the French army thwart the Schlieffen Plan. As the war progressed, the size of the British expeditionary force grew to the point where it was the most formidable allied army by the summer of 1917. It then played the main role in defeating the German army in 1918. Most of the British army exited the continent shortly after the war ended; a small occupation force remained in Germany until 1929.

The fourth period runs from 1929 to the spring of 1939 and covers the years when Britain pursued a policy towards the continent commonly referred to as 'limited liability'.⁴³ Britain made no continental commitment in the early 1930s, when Europe was relatively peaceful and there was a rough balance of power in the region. After Hitler came to power in 1933 and began rearming Germany, Britain did not commit itself to fight on the continent. Instead, after much debate, Britain decided in December 1937 to pass the buck to France to contain Germany. However, British policy-makers quickly realized that France alone did not have the military might to deter Hitler, and that in the event of a war Britain would have to send troops to fight Nazi

Germany – just as it had sent troops to fight Napoleonic France and Wilhelmine Germany.

Britain finally accepted a continental commitment on 31 March 1939, which marks the beginning of the fifth period. Specifically, Britain committed itself to fight with France against Germany if the Wehrmacht attacked Poland. A week later Britain gave the same guarantee to Greece and Romania. When the Second World War broke out five months later, British troops were immediately sent to France, as they had been in the First World War. Although those British forces were pushed off the continent at Dunkirk in June 1940, they returned to Italy with the American army in July 1943 and eventually fought their way into Germany. This period ended with the conclusion of the European half of the Second World War in May 1945.

The sixth period runs from 1945 to 1991 and covers the Cold War. With the Second World War over, Britain planned to move its military forces off the continent after a brief occupation of Germany. However, the rapid emergence of the Soviet threat, the fourth potential hegemon to confront Britain in 150 years, forced Britain to accept a continental commitment in 1948.⁴⁴ British troops, along with American troops remained on the Central Front for the duration of the Cold War.

In sum, it seems clear that over at least the past two centuries Britain has pursued a counter-hegemony strategy towards the European continent. Britain certainly has not pursued isolationism, nor has it been willing to send troops to the mainland for the purpose of maintaining or restoring peace.⁴⁵ Regarding global hegemony, Britain never attempted to dominate Europe, despite the fact that between 1840 and 1860 Britain controlled almost 60 percent of European industrial might. Britain, like the United States, could not be a European hegemon because of the great difficulty of projecting power across a large body of water against rival great powers.

THE PROSPECTS FOR MAINTAINING AMERICAN TROOPS IN EUROPE

The previous discussion of America's past continental commitments seems to indicate that whether the United States remains militarily committed to Europe now that the Cold War is history depends in good part on whether there is a potential hegemon on the continent. If none is in sight and instead there is a rough balance of power among Europe's mightiest states, the United States is not likely to keep its troops in Europe. However, even if there is a potential hegemon, the United States will not necessarily accept a continental commitment. It will most likely do so only if Europe's other great powers cannot contain the potential hegemon by themselves and need American help to accomplish that task. Otherwise, the United States is likely to

pursue a pass-the-buck strategy. Thus, the key question is whether there is a potential hegemon in Europe now or in the foreseeable future that the other European great powers cannot deal with themselves.

There is no potential hegemon in Europe today, and one is not likely to emerge in the near future. Germany and Russia are now the most powerful states on the continent, but neither is likely to threaten to conquer Europe any time soon. The Soviet Union posed a serious threat of overrunning the continent during the Cold War, which is why the United States stationed a large army and thousands of nuclear weapons in Europe. But the Russian remnant state is hardly capable of sweeping into Warsaw, much less Berlin. Indeed, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent disintegration of the Russian economy, coupled with the unification of Germany, redressed the balance of power between Germany and Russia in Germany's favor. Nevertheless, the change does not appear to be so great that Germany is on the verge of becoming a potential hegemon.

The starting point for assessing the European balance of power is to consider the population size and industrial might of the rival states because these are the principal socioeconomic ingredients that go into building a military machine. The most powerful states in the international system invariably have large populations and great industrial wealth. This *latent* power, however, must be converted into *actual* military power, which states usually do at different rates and in different ways. Therefore, it is also necessary to consider the size and shape of the rival militaries. It is especially important to examine the relative strength of the opposing armies (since armies are the principal instrument of conquest) and each side's nuclear weapons capability.

The Russians have enjoyed a large population advantage over Germany throughout the twentieth century, although their present advantage is smaller than at any other time in the past hundred years. Specifically, Russia had approximately 2.6 times as many people as Germany in 1913 (175 million vs 67 million), one year before the First World War broke out, and two times as many people in 1940 (170 million vs 85 million), one year before Nazi Germany invaded the Soviet Union.⁴⁶ This population disadvantage notwithstanding, Germany was the potential hegemon in Europe between 1900 and 1945. In 1987, a representative year of the Cold War, the Soviet Union had roughly 4.7 times as many people as West Germany (285 million vs 61 million). However, Russia today has only about 1.8 times as many people as Germany (149 million vs 81 million).⁴⁷

Germany was the potential hegemon in Europe during the early part of this century, despite its smaller population, mainly because it had a marked advantage over Russia in industrial power. In particular, Germany enjoyed roughly a 3.5:1 advantage in industrial might over Russia in 1913, and approximately a 1.3:1 advantage over the Soviet Union in 1940.⁴⁸ It is difficult to describe the balance of industrial might between these continental powers

during the Cold War, and especially since that conflict ended. The root of the problem is finding reliable figures for Russia. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), the Soviet Union enjoyed roughly a 1.8:1 advantage in industrial might in 1987. By 1995, the IISS calculates that Germany had turned the tables on Russia and enjoyed an advantage of 1.7:1 over the Russians.⁴⁹ However, World Bank figures for 1994 portray an even weaker Russian economy, which gives Germany a startling 5.3:1 advantage in industrial power over Russia.⁵⁰ Regardless of which figure is correct, there is not much doubt that Germany has a significant advantage in latent military power over Russia, much like it had between 1900 and 1945, when it was the dominant military power in Europe.

Germany might now have a marked advantage in latent power over Russia, but that potential military might must be translated into an actual military advantage if Germany is to qualify as a potential hegemon. After all, a state's power is ultimately a function of its military forces and how they compare with the military forces of its main rivals.

It appears that the German army is superior to the Russian army today. The size of Germany's standing army is about 253 000 soldiers, and it can be quickly augmented by 256 000 reserves, thus creating a highly effective fighting force of more than half a million men. It is somewhat difficult to get reliable figures on the Russian army. It seems that the size of Russia's standing army is roughly 460 000.⁵¹ It apparently has a huge pool of reserves, but the Russians would surely have great difficulty mobilizing them quickly and efficiently. Quantity aside, it seems clear from the Russian experience in Chechnya that the German army enjoys a significant qualitative advantage over the Russian army.

The German advantage in conventional forces, however, is offset by the overwhelming advantage that Russia enjoys at the nuclear level. Russia has thousands of nuclear weapons left over from the Cold War, while Germany has none because it continues to depend on the United States for nuclear deterrence. Russia's nuclear monopoly over Germany makes it highly unlikely that Germany would attempt to conquer Russia. France is in a similar situation with regard to Germany. The French army alone is no match for the German army, but France has its own nuclear weapons. France and Russia should be able to contain Germany without help from the United States.

The focus up to this point has been on the existing balance of power between Germany and Russia. However, it is important to consider the likely impact of an American troop withdrawal on that balance. It is also necessary to consider how the Russian economy is likely to evolve over time and how that will affect power relations on the continent.

If the United States pulls its forces out of Europe, Germany would probably alter its existing force structure in significant ways. Germany would be likely to increase the size of its army to compensate for the departing

American army. That move would further increase the German army's advantage over the Russian army. Furthermore, Germany would likely acquire its own nuclear weapons to ensure that it was not vulnerable to Russian nuclear blackmail. It is difficult to imagine any great power, Germany included, tolerating for long a situation where it is surrounded by other great powers with nuclear weapons, but has none of its own.

If Germany acquires its own nuclear deterrent, it would be difficult for Russia to threaten Germany's survival, and Russia already has nuclear weapons to protect itself against Germany. Of course, there would still be intense security competition between Germany and Russia, as there was between the nuclear-armed superpowers in the Cold War. But there would be no compelling reason for the United States to protect either one of those great powers from the other, because each would have a nuclear deterrent to protect itself.

The future of the Russian economy is difficult to predict. The most likely outcome is that there will be a significant, but not spectacular, economic recovery over the next decade. The main reason for optimism is that Russia has the human capital to support a modern industrial economy. If countries like Poland can get their economic house in order, there is good reason to think that the Russians can do the same. If that happens, the present imbalance of latent power between Germany and Russia would be sharply reduced. A healthy Russian economy would, in turn, allow Russia to rebuild its army and make it a worthy rival of the German army. However, in the event that the Russian economy continues to flounder, Russia and France still have their own nuclear arsenals, which would make it difficult for Germany to conquer Europe.

In short, nuclear weapons make it hard for any great power to dominate Europe, thus removing the principal incentive for the United States to maintain its continental commitment.

NOTES

1. Warren Christopher, 'Reinforcing NATO's Strength in the West and Deepening Cooperation with the East', Statement at the North Atlantic Council Ministerial Meeting, Noordwijk, The Netherlands, 30 May 1995.
2. See, for example, Ted Galen Carpenter, *Beyond NATO: Staying Out of Europe's Wars* (Washington, DC: CATO Institute, 1994); Philip H. Gordon, 'Recasting the Atlantic Alliance', *Survival*, 38: 1, Spring 1996, pp. 32-57; and Werner Weidenfeld, *America and Europe: Is the Break Inevitable?* (Gutersloh, Germany: Bertelsmann Foundation Publishers, 1997).
3. Grand strategies address two important questions. First, what are the principal military threats from abroad and how should they be rank-ordered? Second, what kinds of military forces should a state develop to support those commitments? Grand strategy, as used here, is not concerned with how a nation integrates the economic, diplomatic, and military tools at its disposal to support its interests

abroad. Although grand strategy is sometimes defined this way (see, for example, Barry R. Posen, *The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain and Germany between the World Wars* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), p. 13), the concept has a narrower definition here: the relationship between military means and international commitments.

4. American forces have been present on the continent from 1917 to 1923, and 1943 to 1997.
5. For a recent statement of the isolationist position, see Eugene Gholz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, 'Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation', *International Security*, 21: 4, Spring 1997, pp. 5-48. Also see Eric A. Nordlinger, *Isolationism Re-configured: American Foreign Policy for a New Century* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); Bruce Russett, *No Clear and Present Danger: A Skeptical View of the United States, Entry into World War II* (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1972); and Robert W. Tucker, *A New Isolationism: Threat or Promise?* (New York: Universe Press Books, 1972).
6. Exceptional circumstances account for the Crimean case. Russia engaged Britain and France in two different theaters: the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Because the Baltic Sea was close to Russia's most important cities, and the Black Sea was far from them, Russia kept most of its army near the Baltic Sea. Even after British and French troops landed in Crimea, the Russian troops in the Baltic remained put. Furthermore, the communications and transportation network in Russia during the mid-nineteenth century was quite primitive, and therefore it was difficult to supply the Russian forces in Crimea.
7. George Fielding Eliot, *The Ramparts We Watch: A Study of the Problems of American National Defense* (New York: Reynal & Hitchcock, 1938), p. 351.
8. See Samuel P. Huntington, 'Why International Primacy Matters', *International Security*, 17: 4, Spring 1993, pp. 68-83. Also see Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise', in *ibid.*, pp. 5-51. Layne lays out the case for global hegemony in considerable detail, although he argues that it is a misguided strategy.
9. See Nicholas J. Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the Balance of Power* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1942).
10. Josef Joffe first described the United States as Europe's pacifier in an important article that describes how the American military presence in Europe fosters stability. See Josef Joffe, 'Europe's American Pacifier', *Foreign Policy*, 54, Spring 1984, pp. 64-82.
11. Madeleine Albright, Prepared Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 January 1997.
12. Robert J. Art, 'Why Western Europe Needs the United States and NATO', *Political Science Quarterly*, 111: 1, Spring 1996, pp. 1-39; Christoph Bertram, *Europe in the Balance: Securing the Peace Won in the Cold War* (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment, 1995); Michael Mandelbaum, *The Dawn of Peace in Europe* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund Press, 1996); Stephen Van Evera, 'Why Europe Matters, Why the Third World Doesn't: American Grand Strategy after the Cold War', *Journal of Strategic Studies*, 13: 2, June 1990, pp. 1-51; and Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, 'Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy', *International Security*, 21: 3, Winter 1996/97, pp. 5-53, especially note 14.
13. Madeleine Albright, Prepared Statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 8 January 1997.
14. See David Trask, *The AEF and Coalition Warmaking, 1917-1918* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1993).

15. See Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists, 1932-1945* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983), chapter 26; and William L. Langer and S. Everett Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation: The World Crisis of 1937-1940 and American Foreign Policy*, vol. 2 (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1952), chapters 14-15.
16. Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, vol. 2, pp. 504-5.
17. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists*, pp. 11, 364-5.
18. Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, vol. 2, pp. 470, 474-5.
19. The figures in this paragraph are from Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of US Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 45, 81, 103; and Phil Williams, *US Troops in Europe*, Chatham House Papers No. 25 (Boston: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 19. Also see William P. Mako, *US Ground Forces and the Defense of Central Europe* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1983), p. 8.
20. As Marc Trachtenberg notes, 'During the crucial formative period [of NATO] in the early 1950s, everyone wanted a permanent American presence in Europe - everyone, that is, except the Americans themselves. It is hard to understand why the intensity and persistence of America's desire to pull out as soon as she reasonably could has never been recognized, either in the public discussion or in the scholarly literature, because it comes through with unmistakable clarity in the *Foreign Relations* documents.' *History and Strategy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1991), p. 167.
21. See John G. Keliher, *The Negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions: The Search for Arms Control in Central Europe* (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), pp. 144-5.
22. See George F. Kennan, *American Diplomacy, 1900-1950* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), Chapter 4; Walter Lippmann, *US Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1943), pp. 33-9; and Daniel M. Smith, *The Great Departure: The United States and World War I, 1914-1920* (New York: John Wiley, 1965). This is not to deny that other factors contributed to the American decision to enter the war. For example, see Ernest May, *The World War and American Isolation, 1914-1917* (Chicago: Quadrangle Paperbacks, 1966), especially chapter 19.
23. A strong case can be made that if the United States had not entered the war, the German army would have defeated the British and French armies in the spring of 1918 and won the war. See Michael Desch, *Why The Third World Matters: Latin America and United States Grand Strategy* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), pp. 39-44.
24. For evidence of American buckpassing, see Langer and Gleason, *The Challenge to Isolation*, vol. 2, pp. 471, 480.
25. See Jonathan R. Adelman, *Revolution, Armies, and War: A Political History* (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1985), p. 70.
26. On the state of the Red Army during this period, see David M. Glantz and Jonathan House, *When Titans Clashed: How the Red Army Stopped Hitler* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1995), chapters 1-3.
27. See John A. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), especially chapter 11.
28. Alvin D. Coox, *Nomonhan: Japan Against Russia, 1939*, 2 vols (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press); and Hata Ikuhiko, 'The Japanese-Soviet Confrontation, 1935-1939', translated by Alvin D. Coox, in James W. Morley, ed., *Deterrent Diplomacy: Japan, Germany, and the USSR, 1935-1940* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1976), pp. 129-78.
29. Surprisingly, the United States provided hardly any economic assistance to China before 1938 to help prop it up in its war with Japan. See Dorothy Borg, *The United*

- States and the Far Eastern Crisis of 1933–1938* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). However, the United States reversed course in December 1938 and approved its first loan to China. Michael Schaller, *The United States and China in the Twentieth Century*, 2nd edn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990), chapter 3.
30. See Coox, *Nomonhan*, vol. 1, chapter 7.
31. See Paul Haggie, *Britannia At Bay: The Defence of the British Empire against Japan, 1931–1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), pp. 161–3; and Peter Lowe, *Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia, 1937–1941* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), chapter 4.
32. See Waldo Heinrichs, *Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
33. *Ibid.*, chapters 6–7.
34. Spykman makes this point elegantly: 'The position of the United States with regard to Europe as a whole is, therefore, identical to the position of Great Britain in regard to the European Continent. The scale is different, the units are larger, and the distances are greater, but the pattern is the same It is not surprising, then, that we have pursued a similar policy and have apparently become involved in the same vicious cycles of isolation, alliance and war. We, like the British, would prefer to achieve our aim with the least possible amount of sacrifice.' Spykman, *America's Strategy in World Politics*, p. 124. Also see *ibid.*, pp. 103–7. For an excellent analysis of British strategy towards the continent in the eighteenth, nineteenth, and twentieth centuries that roughly parallels the discussion below, see Steven T. Ross, 'Blue Water Strategy Revisited', *Naval War College Review*, 30: 4, Spring 1978, pp. 58–66.
35. Eyre Crowe, 'Memorandum on the Present State of British Relations with France and Germany', 1 January 1907, in G.P. Gooch and Harold Temperley, eds, *British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914*, vol. III (London: His Majesty's Stationery Office, 1928), p. 403.
36. See Correlli Barnett, *Britain and Her Army: A Military, Political and Social Survey* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1974), chapter 11; and Piers Mackesy, 'Problems of an Amphibious Power: Britain against France, 1793–1815', *Naval War College Review*, 30: 4, Spring 1978, pp. 16–25.
37. David Gates, *The Spanish Ulcer: A History of the Peninsular War* (New York: Norton, 1986).
38. Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of British Naval Mastery* (London: Allen Lane, 1976), pp. 181, 210, 233.
39. The one possible exception is the Crimean War (1853–56), where Britain and France invaded Russia's Crimean Peninsula. However, Britain went to war because of fear that Russian expansion at Turkey's expense in the Black Sea region would threaten Britain's lines of communication with India. Britain was not motivated by fear of Russian expansion into Central Europe. Barnett, *Britain and Her Army*, chapter 12.
40. See David G. Herrmann, *The Arming of Europe and the Making of the First World War* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996); and Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers* (New York: Random House, 1987), chapter 5.
41. William L. Langer, *The Franco-Russian Alliance, 1890–1894* (New York: Octagon Books, 1967).
42. Paul M. Kennedy, *The Rise of the Anglo-German Antagonism, 1860–1914* (Boston, Mass.: Allen & Unwin, 1980), chapter 14; and John McDermott, 'The Revolution in British Military Thinking from the Boer War to the Moroccan Crisis', *Canadian Journal of History*, 9: 2, August 1974, pp. 159–77.

43. Among the best works on this period are Brian Bond, *British Military Policy between Two World Wars* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980); Norman H. Gibbs, *Grand Strategy*, vol. I (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1976); and Michael Howard, *The Continental Commitment: The Dilemma of British Defence Policy in the Era of Two World Wars* (London: Temple Smith, 1972).
44. See Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1992), p. 216.
45. Liddell Hart made the argument in the late 1930s that 'the British way in warfare' was to avoid continental commitments and instead rely on its navy to influence the outcome of European wars. See B.H. Liddell Hart, *The British Way in Warfare* (London: Faber, 1932); and B.H. Liddell Hart, *When Britain Goes to War* (London: Faber, 1935). This line of argument has been largely discredited by Brian Bond and Michael Howard, and is not taken seriously by most historians. Brian Bond, *Liddell Hart: A Study of His Military Thought* (London: Cassell, 1977), chapter 3; and Michael Howard, *The British Way in Warfare: A Reappraisal*, The 1974 Neale Lecture in English History (London: Cape, 1975).
46. These population figures are from J. David Singer and Melvin Small, *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1915* (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, 1993). Jonathan Adelman writes that the Russians had a 2.7:1 advantage in 1914 (180 million vs. 67.5 million) and a 2.4:1 advantage in 1941 (187 million vs 78 million). See Adelman, *Revolution, Armies, and War*, pp. 105, 229.
47. These population figures are from *The Military Balance 1988-1989* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), pp. 33, 65; and *The Military Balance 1996-1997* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996), pp. 57, 113.
48. These ratios of industrial might are based on a composite indicator that averages steel production and energy consumption figures for Russia and Germany in the relevant years. The data are from Singer and Small, *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816-1985*.
49. GDP is used as the measure of industrial might for 1987 and 1995. According to the IISS, German GDP for 1987 was 1.12 trillion US dollars, while Russian GDP was somewhere between 1.8 and 2.3 trillion US dollars. *The Military Balance 1988-1989*, pp. 33, 65. I rounded off the Russian figure to 2.0 trillion US dollars. According to the IISS, German GDP for 1995 was 1.908 trillion US dollars, while Russian GDP was 1.110 trillion dollars. *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp. 57, 113.
50. The World Bank estimates Russian GNP for 1994 to be 392.5 billion US dollars, and German GNP for the same year to be 2.075 trillion dollars. See *World Bank Atlas, 1996* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 1995), pp. 18-19. World Bank figures for GDP, rather than GNP, give the Germans a 5.4:1 advantage (2.046 trillion vs 377 billion US dollars). World Bank, *World Development Report, 1996* (Washington, DC: Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 211.
51. These numbers on the rival armies are from *The Military Balance 1996-1997*, pp. 57, 113-14.